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On May 15, 2009, the Illinois Appellate Court reviewed a murder con-

viction in the case of People v. Daniels.' Daniels gave the police a videotaped statement confessing to the murder. 2 But on appeal she claimed that
she lacked the mental capacity to understand the Miranda warnings 3 she
received, and thus could not have knowingly and intelligently waived her
right to remain silent.4 After an extensive review of the testimony of several
medical experts, the appellate court concluded that Daniels's documented
mental deficiencies resulted in her not subjectively understanding the meaning of the Miranda warnings given to her by the police. Finding that the
trial court erred by not suppressing
the confession, the appellate court re6
versed her murder conviction.
The idea that a Mirandawaiver can be invalid based solely on the subjective inability of a suspect to understand the warnings-without any
showing of objectively improper police conduct-has been solidly established in Illinois law for two decades.7 The Illinois Supreme Court's two
most important
decisions in this area are People v. Bernasco8 and People v.
9
Braggs.
*
Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable
research assistance of Colleen DeRosa.
1. 908 N.E.2d 1104 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
2.
Id. at 1105.
3.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4.
Daniels, 908 N.E.2d at 1128.
5. Id. at 1130.
6.
Id. at 1139.
7. See infra notes 8-9.
8.
562 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1990).
9.
810 N.E.2d 472 (I1. 2003).
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The United States Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly held
that a Mirandawaiver can be invalid without some showing of police misconduct. In October 2009 the Court refused to review an en banc decision
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that rejected the
Illinois position by a vote of 9-4.10
But if and when the Roberts Court reviews this issue, there is reason to
believe that it will agree with the Sixth Circuit's position-i.e., rejection of
Illinois' pro-defense Bernasco-Braggs rule-and hold that a Miranda
waiver cannot be found invalid without some objective police misconduct.
In other words, the Court may rule that a showing of a suspect's inability to
subjectively understand Miranda warnings per se is not enough to establish
an invalid waiver.
One purpose of this essay is to alert Illinois courts and attorneys to the
possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court may soon hold that Illinois' Bernasco-Braggsrule is not constitutionally required. But another purpose is to
remind those in the state criminal justice system of a basic principle of federalism: the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court may hold that a rule is not
constitutionally requireddoes not mean that a state is not permittedto continue to use the rule if it so wishes." In areas such as search and seizure,
Illinois has unwisely abandoned doctrines that are constitutionally permitted whenever the U.S. Supreme Court has held a particular doctrine is not
constitutionally mandated. This essay reminds Illinois courts not only that
principles of federalism give them the power to continue to use doctrines
that the U.S. Supreme Court may find are not constitutionally mandatory,
but also that Illinois courts have already done so in interpreting Miranda.
This essay is divided into five parts. Part I sets out the various tests the
U.S. Supreme Court has established for the waiver of different constitutional rights. It will show that there is no "one-size-fits-all" test for a constitutional waiver. It will particularly focus on the significantly different standards for waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, waiver of the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination protected by Miranda,
and waiver of the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
found in "consent" cases.
Part II will then show how in 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court created
confusion by suggesting-contrary to what it had held in Miranda v. Arizona-that before a suspect could challenge his Mirandawaiver, he must as

10.
Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 125 (2009).
11.
For a case distinguishing between what the Constitution "permits" as opposed to
what the Constitution "mandates," see United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385, 391 (7th Cir.
2009).
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a threshold matter show some kind of police misconduct. It then discusses
the new Sixth Circuit case that sharply divided an en banc court.
Part III illustrates the conflicting positions taken by federal and state
courts within Illinois. The Illinois state courts, through the BernascoBraggs line of cases, hold that a suspect's subjective failure to understand
Miranda warnings standing alone will invalidate a Miranda waiver. The
Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, agrees with the Sixth Circuit that some
police misconduct
is a sine qua non for challenging the invalidity of a
12
Miranda waiver.
Part IV discusses why the Roberts Court may very well reject the more
stringent Bernasco-Braggs standard for waiver, if and when it faces the
issue. This part focuses on a very recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Kansas
v. Ventris,13 in which the Court suggests that it sees Miranda as a prophylactic rule, rather than a constitutional rule, which could mean that it will
not impose the more stringent version of the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" standard used for courtroom waivers.
The essay concludes in Part V by contending that, regardless of what
the U.S. Supreme Court may hold in the future, Illinois courts should preserve the Bernasco-Braggsline of cases for two reasons. First, BernascoBraggs is truer to the original conception of custodial interrogation set out
by the Warren Court in Miranda v. Arizona. Second, Bernasco-Braggsrecognizes that even without any police misconduct, a Miranda waiver should
be invalid if the suspect is subjectively incapable of understanding what it
entails.
I.

DIFFERENT WAIVERS, DIFFERENT STANDARDS

The traditional standard for the waiver of a constitutional right was articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938: "A
waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.' 4 It went on to hold that "'courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional
rights."'"
The Court asserted this in the context of the waiver of the right to
counsel in a courtroom setting. Yet in 1965, Yale Kamisar contrasted the
law's interest in enforcing rights in the courtroom with its lack of interest in
enforcing rights in other venues. Comparing the police station and the
courtroom with the "gatehouse" and the "mansion" respectively, he wrote:
12.
13.
14.
15.

See Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998).
129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
304 U.S. 458,464 (1938).
Id. (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)).
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The courtroom is a splendid place where defense attorneys bellow and strut and prosecuting attorneys are
hemmed in at many turns. But what happens before an accused reaches the safety and enjoys the comfort of this
veritable mansion? Ah, there's the rub. Typically he must
first pass through a much less pretentious edifice, a police
station with bare back rooms and locked doors.
In this "gatehouse" of American criminal procedurethrough which most defendants journey and beyond which
many never get-the enemy of the state is a depersonalized
"subject" to be "sized up" and subjected to "interrogation
tactics most appropriate for the occasion"; he is "game" to
be stalked and cornered. 16
One year after these words were written, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.'7 Here for the first time the Court actually
brought the protections of the courtroom into the police interrogation
room. 18 The Court held that the police could not conduct any custodial interrogation without first warning the suspect of his right to silence and right
to an attorney; only if the suspect waived these rights could the police interrogate the suspect. 19 The Court explicitly cited Johnson v. Zerbst in asserting that any such waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently., 20 In a later case, the Court emphasized that:
The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First, the relinquishment of the [Miranda]right must have been voluntary
in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than . . .coercion .... Second, the waiver
must have been made with a full awareness of both the na-

16.

Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American

Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 19-20 (A. E. Dick Howard ed.,

1965) (footnotes omitted).
17.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18.
Id.at 461.
19.
Id.at 444-45,471.
20.
Id.at 444-45 ("The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently."). Later in the opinion, after
stating that the prosecution had a "heavy burden" in proving that "the defendant knowingly
and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel," the Court noted that it had "always set high standards of proof for the
waiver of constitutional rights, and [they] reassert these standards as applied to in-custody
interrogation." Id.at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1936)).
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and the consequences of
ture of the right being abandoned
2
the decision to abandon it. '
Thus, in Miranda the defense bar convinced the Supreme Court to apply the same strict waiver standard in the "gatehouse" that it already used in
the "mansion."
But defense lawyers did not stop here. Seven years later they tried to
further push the envelope by attempting to convince the Court to move the
strict waiver standard out of the police station and to literally "take it to the
streets."
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte22 concerned whether an occupant of a car
properly consented to a police request to search. The defense argued-and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had agreed-that a consent
to search was tantamount to a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, and thus
the Court should apply the traditional constitutional waiver standard: voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.2 3 Therefore, a consent to search could not be
valid unless the police explained to the person that he had a right to refuse
the request.2 4
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that a consent to search need
only be "voluntary," i.e., obtained without government coercion.25 It was
not necessary that the person be informed-or actually know-that he had
the right to refuse.26 The Court conceded that the "voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent" standard was applicable in more formal settings, such as courtrooms or police interrogation rooms.27 But it asserted that because consent
to search is often given "under informal and unstructured conditions,', 28 it
would not hold that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse was an absolute prerequisite for a proper consent to search.
In explaining why giving up trial rights demanded a higher standard of
waiver than consents to search, Schneckloth noted that "[t]here is a vast
difference between those rights that protect a fair criminal trial and the
rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment., 29 The Court stated that
"[a]lmost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent
waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial. 30 Thus, this
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (citation omitted).
412 U.S. 218 (1973).
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 248-49.
Id. at 232-33.
See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237-40.
Id.at 232.
Id.at 241.
Id. at 237.
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higher waiver standard applies to trial situations,3 ' "trial-type" situations,3 2
and guilty pleas (because they involve waiver of trial rights which preclude
a trial).33
The Supreme Court expanded on this in Illinois v. Rodriguez, a case
involving the issue of whether a consensual search had to be based on "actual authority" or whether "apparent authority" could suffice.34 In holding
that "apparent authority" was sufficient, the Court again distinguished between so-called "trial rights" and rights under the Fourth Amendment.35
Since the waiver of a trial right had to be "knowing and intelligent," as well
as voluntary, Rodriguez stated that it would be improper for a trial judge to
find a waiver merely because he "reasonably believed" the defendant had
waived the right; that is, there cannot be a waiver unless that defendant actually had a full awareness of the nature of the right.36 On the other hand,
"apparent authority" was sufficient for a valid consent to search since the
Fourth Amendment does not mandate that police have to be correct; they
merely have to be reasonablein their belief that the person is properly con37
senting.
After Schneckloth in 1973, it appeared that the Court had firmly distinguished between "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" as the standard
for both courtroom and Miranda waivers, with merely a "voluntary" standard being used for consent to searches under the Fourth Amendment. This
was true until the Rehnquist Court returned to the issue in 1986.

II.

DID THE REHNQUIST COURT CHANGE THE MIRANDA WAIVER
STANDARD?

In 1986, in Colorado v. Connelly,38 the Court held that a Miranda
waiver could be found "involuntary" only if there was evidence of coercive
state action, i.e., some "police overreaching., 39 Tellingly, the Court said,
"Miranda protects defendants [only] against government coercion leading
them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that."'

31.
32.
33.

Id. at 236-38.
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236-38.
Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 188-89.
479 U.S. 157 (1986).
Id. at 170.
Id. (emphasis added).

34.

497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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In his dissent, Justice Brennan emphasized that Mr. Connelly had challenged only the "voluntary" prong of his Miranda waiver; he did not challenge either the "knowing" or "intelligent" prongs.4 ' Justice Brennan noted
that the need to prove that a Miranda waiver was "voluntary" was totally
' 2
"independent" from whether the waiver was "intelligent and knowing.
Thus, Justice Brennan insisted, the majority's holding that evidence of "police overreaching" was a necessity should be confined only to the "voluntary" prong.43
Despite Justice Brennan's dissent, Connelly planted the idea that the
entire Miranda waiver-and not just the "involuntary" prong-could not be
challenged unless there was actual government coercion.
This confusion has not been resolved. In a 2009 en banc decision, the
44
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Garner v. Mitchell,
squarely faced the issue of whether a suspect could be found not to have
"intelligently and knowingly" waived his Miranda rights, despite the absence of any finding of police misbehavior. In a 9-4 decision, the Sixth Circuit held that some police misbehavior was a sine qua non not only for a
finding of "involuntariness," but also for a finding that the suspect did not
"intelligently and knowingly" waive his Miranda rights.4 5 In other words,
the court held that the "knowing and intelligent" prong of the Miranda
waiver could not be based on a purely subjective examination of the suspect.
In reaching this decision, the majority assumed arguendo that Garner
did not subjectively understand the Miranda warnings prior to his waiver.
But the court did not find this fact to be dispositive. The key fact, the court
noted, was that "the officers questioning Garner had no way to discern the
misunderstanding in Garner's mind. This is of primary significance given
the original purpose underlying the Miranda decision, which was to 'reduce
the likelihood that the suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation. ' '' 46 The court held that all three
factors-voluntary, knowing, and intelligent-had to be examined from the
totality of the circumstances and that "[t]he underlying police-regulatory

See id.
at 188 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41.
Id. Indeed, the dissent suggested that on remand the Colorado state courts were
42.
free to consider the separate issue of whether the waiver was intelligent and knowing. Id.at
184 n.5.
43.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 187-88.
44.
Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 125 (2009).
Id.
45.
Id. at 262 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984)).
46.
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purpose of Miranda compels that these circumstances
be examined .. .
47
primarilyfrom the perspective of the police."'
The dissent sharply disagreed with this analysis. It insisted that the
majority's position conflicted with "the Supreme Court's repeated pronouncements that the proper inquiry is whether the defendant actually had
the capability to make a knowing and intelligent waiver without any reference to police conduct. 'A 8 If, as the majority claims, the validity of a
Miranda waiver should depend only on police conduct or knowledge, then
they have read the "knowing and intelligent" requirement completely out of
the Supreme Court's Mirandajurisprudence. It distinguished Connelly by
emphasizing that, although that case found coercive police activity to be a
necessary part of a finding of involuntariness, it never said that such activity was a sine4 qua
non for a finding that a Mirandawaiver was not knowing
9
or intelligent.
The majority and dissent in Garner are thus divided by a very basic
distinction: Should the focus of Miranda be the prevention of coercive police behavior? Or should the focus be on guaranteeing that the suspect actually understands his rights?
Interestingly, courts in Illinois reflect the same division.
III.
nois.

THE RULE IN ILLINOIS? IT DEPENDS ON THE FORUM

Consider the differing views held by state and federal courts in Illi-

In 1990, four years after the U.S. Supreme Court decided Colorado v.
Connelly, the Illinois Supreme Court faced a Miranda waiver issue in People v. Bernasco.5 ° The issue was whether the lack of coercive state action
per se precluded a finding that a Mirandawaiver was improper. 51 The state
read Connelly as holding that proof of coercive police action was necessary
to challenge any of the requirements of waiver: voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. 52 The defense, on the other hand, contended that Connelly's requirement of coercive state action applied only to the voluntariness issue,
but was not necessary for a finding that a waiver was not knowing and intelligent. 3 In other words, the defense claimed that a Miranda waiver could
be found not to be "knowing and intelligent" based solely on the subjective
characteristics of the suspect, even if they were unknown to the police.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.at 263 (emphasis added).
Id. at 275 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Garner,557 F.3d at 275.
562 N.E.2d 958 (Ill. 1990).
Id.at 959.
Id.
See id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the defense. Citing the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine,5 4 the court held that a
Miranda waiver had "two distinct dimensions": "(1) whether there was a
free, uncoerced choice and (2) whether there was awareness of the right and
the consequences of abandoning it."55 Thus, a valid Miranda waiver has
two separate components: "both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level
of comprehension. 5 6 And in order for a waiver to be "knowing and intelligent," a suspect must be subjectively aware both of his right to have an
attorney with him during any interrogation, and the fact that any statement
he makes may be used against him in a criminal proceeding.5 7 The Bernasco court cited a number of Illinois cases that had previously agreed with
this interpretation of Miranda both before and after the Connelly decision in
1986.58
In 2004, the Illinois Supreme Court, in the course of finding that a
mentally retarded woman had not knowingly and intelligently waived her
5 9
Miranda rights, gave a ringing endorsement to its decision in Bernasco
And, as discussed above, Illinois courts have most recently applied Bernasco-Braggs to reverse a murder conviction in May 2009 in People v.
Daniels.
But contrast Bernasco with the Seventh Circuit's position. In Rice v.
Cooper,60 the court faced the issue of whether a suspect's mental condition
could per se result in a finding that a Mirandawaiver was not knowing and
intelligent. The court began by acknowledging Connelly's holding that
mental derangement standing alone could never result in an involuntary
confession. From this it deduced that "[t]he relevant constitutional principles are aimed not at protecting people from themselves but at curbing abuIt then noted "[o]n this analysis, the
sive practices by public officers.'
knowledge of the police is vital. If they have no reason.., to think that the
suspect doesn't understand [the Miranda warnings], there is nothing that

54.

475 U.S. 412 (1986).

56.

Id. (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421) (emphasis added by the Illinois Supreme

55.
Court).

Bernasco, 562 N.E.2d at 960.

57. Id. at 962-63.
58.
Id. at 964-65 (citing People v. Evans, 530 N.E.2d 1360 (Il. 1988); People v.
Rogers, 528 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. 1988); People v. St. Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61 (111. 1988); People v.
Thompkins, 521 N.E.2d 38 (Ill. 1988); People v. Murphy, 381 N.E.2d 677 (111. 1978); People v. Medina, 375 N.E.2d 78 (Il. 1978); People v. Turner, 306 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. 1973)).
People v. Braggs, 810 N.E.2d 472 (Ill. 2004); see also In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d
59.

908 (Ill. 1995); In re M.W., 731 N.E.2d 358 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
60.
61.

148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998).
Id.at 750.
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smacks of abusive behavior .... [T]he question is . . .whether the
62 police
believed [the suspect] understood their explanation of those rights.
The court conceded that this emphasis on police behavior was at odds
with the conventional approach to Miranda waivers, which focused subjectively on whether the suspect made a knowing and intelligent waiver. 63 But
the court stated that it did not find it to be a satisfactory distinction that an
involuntary confession or waiver, but not an unknowing waiver, required
coercive police activity. As the Rice court pointedly asked,
If Connelly's waiver of his Fifth Amendment right not to
confess was effective even though the confession was induced by madness rather than by remorse or calculation,
why should a waiver of Miranda rights be ineffective if
prompted solely by the defendant's mental condition rather
by anything the police did? 64
Similar to the Sixth Circuit's division between the majority and dissent
in Garnerv. Mitchell, the division between Illinois state courts and the Seventh Circuit involves whether the Miranda waiver should be evaluated from
the objective view of police behavior or the subjective view of the suspect's
understanding.

IV.

THE FUTURE OF MIRANDA WAIVERS: WHY THE ROBERTS
COURT MAY REJECT ILLINOIS' BERNASCO-BRA GGS POSITION

The Sixth Circuit's fractured en banc decision in Garner v. Mitchell
may indicate that the proper standard for waiver of Miranda rights is an
issue the U.S. Supreme Court will re-visit. And, as the Garner majority
illustrates, there is a possibility that the Court may retreat from the "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" standard for a Miranda waiver.
When the Warren Court decided Miranda in 1966, it seemed clear that
it viewed the decision as constitutionally predicated on the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. And by applying the traditional "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent" standard for waiver of constitutional rights to the waiver issue, it certainly indicated that a violation of
Mirandawas a clear violation of a constitutional right.
Yet a series of cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts undermined the constitutional basis of Miranda by calling it merely a "pro62.
63.
64.
Rice when

Id.at 750-51.
Id.
Id.at 751. The Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
deciding Garnerv. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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phylactic rule. 65 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts refused to hold that
every Miranda violation was necessarily an actual constitutional violation;
according to this view, not all statements obtained in violation of Miranda
were actually "compelled" pursuant to the Self-Incrimination Clause.
James Tomkovicz has commented on this lack of fit between the
Miranda rules and a Fifth Amendment violation.6 6 He has characterized the
Miranda regime as a system of lawyer-assisted interrogation whose purpose
it is to help prevent the possibility of compulsion. 67 Thus, a suspect's refusing assistance under Miranda is not the same as waiving the constitutional
right not to be compelled under the Fifth Amendment; rather, refusing assistance is merely deciding not to accept a court-created bonus that might
help prevent a suspect from being actually compelled. Consequently,
Tomkovicz says,
[T]he Zerbst standards and "waiver" terminology, which
are appropriate for decisions to relinquish other constitutional rights.., should be expelled from Miranda law. The
[F]ifth [A]mendment choice should instead be characterized as a decision not to take advantage of the entitlement
"to be free from police interrogations in the absence of
counsel."68
Yet despite this view that Miranda is merely prophylactic, it is certainly possible to characterize a Miranda violation as an actual Fifth
Amendment violation. Justice O'Connor provided just such a rationale in
her concurring and dissenting opinion in New York v. Quarles,69 the case
that established the "public safety" exception to Miranda. There she construed Miranda as creating a system in which any statement obtained in
violation would be "presumed compelled" and therefore actually obtained
in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause.7 ° In other words, in Justice
O'Connor's view, all custodial interrogations conducted without following
the Miranda rules resulted in presumptively compelled statements that explicitly violated the Self-Incrimination Clause. Thus, Justice O'Connor re-

65.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
66.
James J. Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IowA L. REv. 975 (1986).
67.
See id. at 1049-50.
68.
Id. at 1050-51 (quoting Henderson v. Florida, 473 U.S. 916, 917 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
69.
467 U.S. 649, 660-75 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

70.

Id. at 664.
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jected the legal or logical possibility of any exception to Miranda--"public
safety" or otherwise."
The constitutional status of Miranda v. Arizona was supposed to have
been finally settled with the Court's decision in 2000 in Dickerson v.
United States.7 2 The bottom-line was that the Dickerson majority held both
that Miranda was a "constitutional rule" that Congress could not legislatively supersede,7 3 and that stare decisis compelled the Court to preserve the
Miranda decision. Yet nowhere in the majority opinion is there an explicit
explanation-something similar to Justice O'Connor's "presumed compelled" theory-as to exactly why a Miranda violation violates the SelfIncrimination Clause.74
Moreover, hopes that Dickerson had finally put Miranda on a firm
constitutional footing were quickly dashed. The Court immediately went
back to its practice of referring to Miranda as merely establishing a "prophylactic rule."75
In this light, consider the Supreme Court's recent decision in Kansas v.
Ventris.76 This case concerned whether statements obtained by the police in
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel (and thus excluded from
the prosecution's case-in-chief pursuant to Massiah v. United States77 )
could nevertheless be used for impeachment. 78 Ventris held that the government would be allowed to impeach the defendant with these statements.79
In explaining why, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court differentiated
between an actual constitutional violation and a mere violation of a constitutionally-related prophylactic rule. For example, his opinion notes, the
71.
Yet in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990), Justice O'Connor did recognize a "booking question" exception to Miranda where the police questions were designed
solely to secure biographical data needed for booking purposes and not intended to elicit
incriminating statements, see id at 600-02.
72.
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
73.
Id.at 437 (holding that Congress did not have the authority to evade the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda, and thus voided 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which stated that a
Miranda violation would not exclude an otherwise voluntary confession from being admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief at a federal criminal trial).
74. Indeed, Justice Scalia's dissent in Dickerson bluntly states that the majority
cannot say that a Miranda violation is always a constitutional violation "because a majority
of the Court does not believe it." Id.at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75.
See Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S.Ct. 1841 (2009); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S.
630 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
76.
129 S.Ct. 1841 (2009).
77.
377 U.S. 201 (1964).
78.
Massiah held that once a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached, the government was prohibited from "deliberately eliciting" incriminating statements
from the defendant in the absence of his attorney. Id. at 206.
79.
Ventris, 129 S.Ct. at 1847.

2010]

ILLINOIS COURTS AND THE LA w OF MIRANDA WAIVERS

Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself at a criminal trial.8 ° If the prosecution introduces what
he characterizes as a "truly coerced confession" 81 in any way at trial-either
in its case-in-chief or its impeachment of the defendant-this results in an
actual Fifth Amendment violation.
He distinguishes this from the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
Exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence is not part of the actual
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment; exclusion, rather, is a sanction that is
used only when it will effectively deter improper police behavior.82 Thus,
such evidence83 may be used for impeachment without violating the Fourth
Amendment.
He also distinguishes an actual constitutional violation from a violation under the rule of the subsequently-overruled case of Michigan v. Jackson 84 -what he characterizes as a "Sixth Amendment prophylactic rule[]
forbidding certain pretrial police conduct., 85 Because the Jackson rule is
merely prophylactic, the otherwise-suppressed statements may be used to
impeach the defendant at trial.86
Finally, he characterizes statements taken in violation of Miranda as
not being "truly coerced," but rather suppressed under a Fifth Amendment
"prophylactic rule[] forbidding certain pretrial police conduct., 87 Likewise,
because the Miranda rule is merely prophylactic, the otherwise-suppressed
statements may be used to impeach the defendant at trial.88
Turning to the issue in the case at bar, Ventris held that the lesson of
the above three situations is that mere "tainted evidence-evidence whose
very introduction does not constitute the constitutional violation, but whose
89
obtaining was constitutionally invalid-is admissible for impeachment."
Since courts have a strong interest in preventing perjury, "the game of excluding tainted evidence for impeachment purposes is not worth the candle." 90

80. Id.at 1845.
81.
Id.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 n.6 (explaining that the exclu82.
sionary rule must "pay its way" to be justified in any particular case).
83.
Ventris, 129 S. Ct. at 1845 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65
(1954)).
84.
475 U.S. 625 (1986). Within weeks of the Ventris decision, the Supreme Court
overruled Michigan v. Jackson. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 2079 (2009).
85.
Ventris, 129 S.Ct. at 1845.
86.
Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
87.
Ventris, 129 S.Ct. at 1845.
88.
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
89.
Ventris, 129 S.Ct. at 1847.
90. Id.at 1846.
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Ventris may offer a clue as to what the Supreme Court would do if it
re-examined the issue of the proper standard of waiver for Miranda rights.
Note how the Court has grouped Miranda with the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and with the subsequently overruled case of Michigan v.
Jackson. Also note how during the past decade the Court has grown increasingly hostile towards all three of these doctrines, all with their roots
firmly in the pro-defense Warren Court of the 1960s. 91
As for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have limited it in numerous ways during the last forty
years. 92 Furthermore, the Roberts Court has recently decided two cases
which suggest that the Court may be close to eliminating the rule entirely. 93
And as to Michigan v. Jackson, the 94
Supreme Court explicitly overruled it
four weeks after the Ventris decision.
As for Miranda, years of decisions from the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have limited its reach in many ways. 95 It is true that in 2000, the
Dickerson Court found Miranda to be constitutionally predicated and refused to overrule it. 96 Yet in a trilogy of cases since Dickerson, the Court
has restricted Miranda's reach even further.97 If a case such as Garner v.
Mitchell were reviewed by the current Supreme Court, it would be very
possible that the five generally pro-prosecution justices 98 would adopt the
Sixth Circuit's view that whether a suspect has "knowingly and intelligently" waived his rights should be examined only from the perspective of
what the police could have reasonably observed about the suspect. Since the
Court has for years referred to Miranda as merely a prophylactic rule, they

91.
Both Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio were decided by the Warren Court.
Although Michigan v. Jackson was a Burger Court case, three of the five justices forming

the majority in Jackson had also served on the Warren Court.

92.
For a discussion of the cases that have limited the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, see Herringv. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699-703 (2009).
93.
Id.; see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
94.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), overruled by Montejo v. Louisiana,
129 S. Ct. 2079 (2009).
95.
See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-42 (2000) (providing examples of pro-prosecution Mirandadecisions).
96. Id.
97.
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (finding that Miranda is a prophylactic rule and that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" exception is inapplicable); Missouri v.
Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (holding that Dickerson does not invalidate Oregon v. Elstad);
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (holding that no Miranda violation can take place
in the interrogation room, that Miranda is merely a rule of evidence exclusion, and describing Miranda as a prophylactic rule).
98.
These justices being Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Alito, Thomas,
and Kennedy. Out of twenty-three cases that were decided 5-4 during the 2008 term, these
five justices comprised the majority in eleven of the twenty-three cases.
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could hold that the more stringent "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent"
standard for constitutional trial rights is inapplicable in this setting.
The U.S. Supreme Court has overruled Michigan v. Jackson and may
very well be ready to jettison the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.
Thus, it would not be a surprise to see the Roberts Court make it easier for
the prosecution to prove that a suspect properly waived his Miranda rights
by focusing on the objective police conduct rather than the suspect's subjective understanding.
If this occurs, what effect will it have in Illinois?
V.

THE FUTURE OF MIRANDA WAIVERS IN ILLINOIS COURTS

As previously noted, the Illinois Supreme Court has mandated a strict
standard for Miranda waivers. According to the Bernasco-Braggs line of
cases, a Miranda waiver can be found not to be "knowing and intelligent"
based solely on the subjective characteristics of the suspect-whether or not
they are observable by the police.
And obviously, regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court may decide, principles of federalism allow the Illinois Supreme Court to keep the
Bernasco-Braggs standard by finding "adequate and independent" state
grounds for the rule. 99

The problem is that the Illinois Supreme Court has rarely been so inclined. It will usually abandon any state doctrine once the U.S. Supreme
Court has held otherwise. This is particularly true in the area of search and
seizure law;' 00 however, in that area the court has justified its position by
claiming that "limited lockstep" on search and seizure issues is what the
framers
of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 intended Illinois courts to foll0
low. '

Yet defense attorneys may have a better chance of getting the Illinois
Supreme Court to preserve Bernasco-Braggsin the face of contrary U.S.
Supreme Court authority. The Illinois Supreme Court has at least once rejected a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the area of custodial interrogation. In
1994, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. McCauley'0 2 refused to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's pro-prosecution ruling in Moran
v. Burbine.0 3 Thus, Illinois does not seem to follow the U.S. Supreme
Court in lockstep on Miranda issues.
99.

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

See Timothy P. O'Neill, "Stop Me Before I Get Reversed Again ": The Failure
100.
of Illinois Appellate Courts to Protect Their CriminalDecisionsfrom United States Supreme
Court Review, 36 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 893, 898 (2005).
101.
Id. at 913-19 (discussing "limited lockstep" doctrine).
1994).
102.
645 N.E.2d 923 (Ill.
103.
475 U.S. 412 (1986).
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It is important for Illinois courts and attorneys to prepare for the possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court might adopt a much more prosecutionfriendly version of the Mirandawaiver. But it is equally important that Illinois courts and attorneys remember that such a decision need not have any
constitutional effect on Illinois courts. Illinois has followed the BernascoBraggs line of cases for the last two decades. In doing so, it explicitly rejected the invitation in Colorado v. Connelly to adopt a more crabbed, proprosecution version of the Miranda waiver. Whatever the U.S. Supreme
Court may do in the future, the Illinois Supreme Court should find that Bernasco-Braggs is supported by an independent and adequate basis in Illinois
constitutional law.

